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The unfeasibility of building a political nation 
in Czechoslovakia 1918–1939. 
A case study of Milan Hodža 
 
Igor Jašurek1 
 
Abstract: The author analyses Milan Hodža’s political thoughts on nationalism. The point of departure is the author’s critique of the 
concept of political nationhood as developed in the current scholarship on Czechoslovakism vis-à-vis the author’s approach based 
on the concept of particularism versus universalism. This enables the author to claim that the ambiguities of Hodža’s thoughts 
arise from Hodža’s oscillation between loyalty to Czechoslovakism and the Slovak identity. 
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1. Introduction 
The Preamble of the Constitution explicitly declares the existence of a Czechoslovak 
nation: “We, the Czechoslovak nation…” (Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity 1998: 110), 
supported also by a constitutional statement on the existence of the Czechoslovak language. It is 
evident that the concept of Czechoslovakism postulates the indivisibility of the nation it stands 
for. However, the statement leaves open the definition of that nation. This issue was the subject 
of contemporary political and scholarly elaborations of Czechoslovakism evolving into numerous 
interpretations mutually and internally in friction and contradicting. 
Therefore Czechoslovakism represents a political doctrine, along with the ideas and 
political practices supporting the indivisibility of the titular nation. Among the most influential of 
these ideas were concepts interpreting Czechoslovakism as a project of political nationhood. 
Conceptualisations of a political Czechoslovak nation focus almost exclusively on Czech-
Slovak relations, with little concern for ethnic minorities which are of no lesser importance for 
the utilization of political nationhood. Yet these are not only excluded from the contemporary 
projects for political Czechoslovakism, but the current scholarship blatantly follows the same 
conceptual fallacy, avoiding them in analyses of Czechoslovakism while focusing on Czech and 
Slovak relations as a basis for political nationhood. 
                                                 
1 The author is a full-time doctoral student at the Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social Studies, 
Masaryk University, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno; e-mail: jasurek@fss.muni.cz. 
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From the perspective of Czech and Slovak relations, the project of nation-building in 
Czechoslovakia 1918-1939 is an example of building of the imagined community on two levels; 
one, formation on the level of the respective nations constituting the state, another promulgated 
by the state. Both of them are overlapping. Their mutual interaction and experience is 
unprecedented as a history of two constituent nations determining their coexistence for the rest 
of the existence of Czechoslovakia in the twentieth century. 
The mutual competition between two national ideas of a Czechoslovak and a Slovak 
nation markedly characterize the political thoughts of Milan Hodža. I will argue that ambiguities 
of Hodža’s views on projecting the desired national arrangements, though politically pragmatic, 
not only prevent him from clearly formulating and defining the mutual relations of the two 
nations, but more importantly, these ambiguities show the practical impossibility of building a 
political Czechoslovak nation even if we narrow the analysis down exclusively to mutual Czech 
and Slovak relations. 
I will analyze Hodža’s views on the basis of the universalism-particularism dichotomy. 
Particularism in general considers the specific aspects of belonging to a specific national 
community and adherence to fundamental and distinguishing values of this community, while the 
universalistic perspective emphasizes general aspects of belonging, a sharing of things in 
common, for example, moral values or ideals above the national level of a respective nation. 
Before the main analysis, I will argue against other existing dichotomies utilized in the 
current scholarship on Czechoslovakism that indicate or directly claim the existence of or efforts 
towards projecting political nationhood, at least in the early years of Czechoslovakia. This 
approach originates in conceptual uncertainties of contemporary politicians or commentators 
adhering to political Czechoslovakism, such as Hodža himself. I will deal with this in the 
following chapter. 
 
2. Conceptual aspects of the particularism-universalism dichotomy 
 
2.1. Conceptual interpretation of a doctrine of Czechoslovakism 
There is a fundamental misinterpretation of the nature of the doctrine of 
Czechoslovakism in the current scholarship (Pekník 2000; Kováč 1997; Bakoš 1994, 1995; 
Broklová 1993) emphasizing the existence of or endeavours to project a model of political 
nationhood. Therefore, before embarking on a critique of existing dichotomies justifying 
projecting of a political Czechoslovak nation and presenting my concept of the universalism-
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particularism dichotomy, I will identify major conceptual flaws in the current scholarship on 
Czechoslovakism. 
The fundamental misinterpretation of Czechoslovakism as the political doctrine of a 
respective nation-state is the accentuation of the historical continuation of the idea of 
Czechoslovakism into its ideological expression in Czechoslovakia 1918–1939. The rise of 
Czechoslovakia is from this perspective a logical continuation and advancement of existing 
Czechoslovak ties, yet these ties are by definition predominantly cultural. (Bartlová 2000: 587) 
This argument enables scholars to claim that Czechoslovakism is initially projected on the 
idea of political nationhood, eventually transforming into the detrimental ethnic variant. This 
transformation is perceived as the failure of political elites to take advantage of the national 
euphoria in the early days of the Republic and build Czechoslovakism on the foundations of a 
political/civic concept rather than one of ethnic nationhood. There is also a so-called betrayal 
argument charging Slovak politicians with disloyalty to Slovak individuality, which they allegedly 
sacrificed for the sake of their careers. These Slovak politicians are commonly and 
indiscriminately labelled as centralists. (Bakoš 1994, 1995) I will argue also against this 
misinterpretation. 
The point of departure of my critique is my accentuation of the rise of Czechoslovakia 
with its ethnic composition as an unexpected and unprecedented outcome of World War I. The 
other is the historical absence of the idea of a Czechoslovak nation, unless we count mutual 
cultural ties, which from the perspective of the new state have a symbolic character, but which 
nevertheless are salient for ideological justification of a central doctrine of Czechoslovakism in 
search of its historical legitimacy. 
Therefore I also emphasize 1918 as a new starting point in terms of the political nature of 
Czech and Slovak relations, with unpredictable prospects for development, rather than a natural 
evolution toward a political Czechoslovak nation grounded on pre-existing cultural ties. 
Following this path in interpreting Czechoslovakism is erroneous. This is the major conceptual 
drawback of the current scholarship. 
Consequently, ‘ethnicized’ Czechoslovakism is criticised for its failure to recognize the 
Slovak national individuality. Thus, the feasibility of making a political nation is pre-empted by a 
positive justification of Slovak individuality. Also taken from this perspective, politically 
understandable, yet conceptually erroneous, are Hodža’s political views on the feasibility of a 
political Czechoslovak nation. 
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2.2. Conceptualising dichotomies as an analytical tool 
The ethnic-civic dichotomisation becomes an influential analytical tool for the 
interpretation of Czechoslovakism. Naturally, in Czechoslovakia, built from constituent nations 
with such unequal historical, political, social, and intellectual development, existing national 
divisions stimulate scholars to explain national arrangements via elaborate distinctions. 
Before I present my dichotomy, I will argue against the ethnic-civic (political) dichotomy. 
In the context of this paper, the civic/political represents Czechoslovakism attempting to exceed 
and unify the local Czech and Slovak identities, while the ethnic stands for the Slovak 
individuality resisting efforts to challenge it. At the same time the Slovak individuality strives for 
its political manifestation. Beside the ethnic-civic dichotomy, there are two other related variants 
of this dichotomy: the traditionalism-modernism dichotomy and the nationalism-patriotism 
dichotomy. All of these dichotomies are utilized to justify of the concept of a Czechoslovak 
political nation, or for decrying its absence. 
The ethnic-civic dichotomy is represented by Czechoslovakism per se. As argued before, 
I do not think that Czechoslovakia was initially built on the idea of a political nation. Considering 
‘the ethnic minority factor’, ethnic justification in the doctrine of Czechoslovakism unequivocally 
prevails. Such an idea of a political nation would consider only Czechs and Slovaks (Šedivý 2000: 
565). Excluding minorities would undermine the seriousness of this national project, thus also the 
use of the ethnic-civic dichotomy. This fact is not taken seriously by most of the current 
scholarship. 
The second variant, the modernism-traditionalism dichotomy, identifies two intellectual 
currents in the Slovak national movement at the end of the nineteenth century. One is labelled as 
progressive or modern, represented by Masaryk and his Slovak followers including Milan Hodža. 
Modernists, representing ‘Westernisation’, strive for a recreated national image free of stringent 
ethnic ties.2 The other is conservative or traditionalist, representing continuity with the nineteenth 
century romantic national ideal grounded on ethnicity, revolving around the so called the Martin 
centre3 represented notably by writer Svetozár Hurban Vojanský, then later in Czechoslovakia by 
the Slovak autonomist movement. 
                                                 
2 This primarily means the overcoming of a romanticized and old-fashioned national ideal with a strong Russophile 
orientation. 
3 Martin is a Central Slovak town associated with some of the important events and personalities of the nineteenth-
century national emancipation process. 
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It seems that, for Bakoš, the origins of Czechoslovakism are in fact a modern response to 
traditionalist views on nation-building processes in Central Europe. There are three problems 
with this notion. Firstly, Czechoslovakism as a modern national response does not explain the 
eventual synthesis of modernist and traditionalist features in political practices during the entire 
existence of Czechoslovakia. In other words, why was it that some Slovak politicians and 
intellectuals with Czechoslovakist attitudes, and devoted ‘Masarykists’ in the pre-Czechoslovak 
era, were susceptible to becoming not only aware of their own separate Slovak individuality, but 
were prepared to recognize it politically. This is likely to challenge Czechoslovak indivisibility. 
Certainly, Milan Hodža is such an example. Here the interpretation of the state doctrine of 
Czechoslovakism evolving naturally from previous cultural interaction between Czechs and 
Slovaks does not work. 
Secondly, the dichotomy, as initially applied to the pre-Czechoslovak era, becomes 
blurred in Czechoslovakia and it is difficult to recognize respective agents of the dichotomy, since 
their roles are changing in the dynamic environment of the new state. Those identified as 
modernists in the pre-Czechoslovak era are no longer seen as bearers of progressive national 
ideas, and they are criticized and rejected by successive political generations, with the possible 
exception of Milan Hodža. 
Thirdly, the fact that Czechoslovakist concepts challenge the tradition of the romanticized 
ideal of the Slovak nation does not make them inevitably modern. These concepts use very 
similar means for projecting a desired national image such as language, culture, or cult of 
ancestors. Thus, the myth of ethnic descent epitomised in the myth of Great Moravia as the first 
nation-state is a factor in both Czechoslovakist theories (Galandauer: 2000: 539) and Hodža4, and 
the political legitimization of the rise of the Slovak state, the Nazi puppet state, in 1939. 
The second variant of the ethnic-civic dichotomy is the patriotism-nationalism 
dichotomy. Here the ethnic stands for ‘nationalism’ and it (fiercely) demands ethnic homogeneity 
while the civic, called ‘patriotism’, is defined as love of country, expressis verbis; love of the 
republic embodied in its institutions guaranteeing all kinds of liberties. Obligations to a country 
may be on occasion preceded by obligations to humanity that give patriotism a more 
universalistic character. 
However, a major problem of this variant is its utilisation in political practice. Here it is 
extremely difficult to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism, because they often do not 
                                                 
4 Thus for example Edvard Beneš, minister of foreign affairs and future president, in 1918 traces the roots of the 
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bear essentially ideal attributes: the harmlessness of the former and the irreconcilable ferocity of 
the latter. Nationalism and patriotism are used interchangeably and their agendas may be as well. 
It is clear that the ethnic-civic dichotomy and its variants by no means justify the concept 
of a Czechoslovak political nation. Moreover, as Robert Fine points out, both the ethnic and 
civic concepts are manifestations of nationalism which is a fickle beast, and as such it imposes 
demands for exclusivity and uniqueness. (Mortimer 1999: 154) This fact is completely avoided by 
the current scholarship on Czechoslovakism. 
Furthermore, in my case study on Milan Hodža and on the basis of the particularism-
universalism dichotomy, I will demonstrate the practical unfeasibility of building a political 
nationhood on Czechoslovakism. 
 
2.3. Conceptual aspects of the particularism-universalism dichotomy 
There are basically two models of the dichotomy particularism-universalism. In the first 
model, allegiance to universal values of mankind is valued above particularistic membership in a 
national community. Here nationalism strives for more a universalistic expression, as it exceeds a 
national community. This model is championed by Mazzini. 
In the second model, the dichotomy functions at the national community level. In this 
second type, one national community is perceived as having achieved (or having a tangible 
promise of achieving) an advanced level of organization, while there is also a less developed or 
entirely underdeveloped national community.5 Membership, or its refusal, in a supposedly 
advanced community gains a utilitarian character. Accessing it brings some benefits as opposed 
to prioritizing membership in a perceivably marginalized group which does not bring sufficient 
benefits. This model can be found in Mill’s Considerations on representative government. 
Czechoslovakism represents in Mill’s model a doctrine of an advanced national 
community which provides a primary national and political bond also enabling access to and 
careers in state institutions and bodies of the state as well as protection for members of a 
Czechoslovak national community.6 So a national identity is created via political loyalty. 
Evidently, the second model of the particularism-universalism dichotomy also offers two 
options: utilitarian accommodation to an advanced national community (Czechoslovakism), or 
                                                 
5 Indeed, this is a very subjective judgment characterized much less by empirical evidence and more as a tool for 
political struggles. 
6 Indeed, members of ethnic minorities are not excluded from state guaranteed protection even though they are not 
considered to be within the project of a political Czechoslovak nation. 
Středoevropské politické studie  roč. IX, č. 1, s. 14-27 
Central European Political Studies Review  Vol. IX, Number 1, pp. 14-27 
Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity  ISSN 1212-7817 
 
 
 
20 
prioritizing the ties of a community perceived to be marginalized (a Slovak identity). In Hodža’s 
concept the two overlap, with a continuous shift towards the latter. 
Importantly, the community origin of the second model also implies that 
Czechoslovakism, though presented as a political nation devoid of the primacy of ethnicity,7 is 
first of all a national project. Consequently, it can not be devoid of the symptoms of nationalism 
such as demands for national exclusivity and uniqueness. 
The particularistic-universalistic dichotomy shows the ambiguities and shifts of Hodža’s 
construction of Czechoslovak unity. Partially, it also attempts to draw motives of action behind 
Hodža’s construction which may also help to show his struggling ambitions. Since his stances, 
regardless of envisioned ideas are conditioned by the hectic political environment and as such 
they are subjected to frequent political changes which ambitious Hodža can not overlook. 
Furthermore, despite the declared historical continuity, Hodža’s theorizing on political 
Czechoslovakism evolves rather from a vacuum as a result of the unexpected and unprecedented 
rise of Czechoslovakia rather than from pre-existing concepts or plans. Therefore the dichotomy 
emphasizes political change or oscillation along with theoretical ambivalence rather than any 
historical or political continuation of pre-existing models. It emphasizes 1918 as a new starting 
point with an unpredictable course of development. 
 
3. Milan Hodža. From political universalism to national particularism 
Milan Hodža was indisputably the most dominant and influential Slovak politician during 
the entire existence of inter-war Czechoslovakia, and perhaps the most pronounced advocate of 
political Czechoslovakism. His wide range of activities as well as his views as leader of the 
Agrarian party and Prime Minister 1935–1938 he described in his numerous articles and studies, 
and one book. 
In his book “The Czechoslovak Split” (Československý rozkol), Hodža stresses primarily 
political motives for the language split in the nineteenth century. He asserts that behind the 
emergence of a codified Slovak language, de facto disrupting Czechoslovak political and cultural 
unity, is the idea of a distinctive Slovak nation (Hodža 1920: 8-9). As Hodža explains, this is a 
consequence of national conditions in Upper Hungary. The Slovak representation, on one hand, 
strives to manifest the Slovak individuality; on the other, it also expresses the continuous loyalty 
to natio Hungarica. 
                                                 
7 Examples of the ethnic variant of Czechoslovakism are works of Albert Pražák, Václav Chaloupecký and Emanuel 
Chalupný. 
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What is, however, more intriguing than the analysis of the split is that Hodža does not 
present any tangible example of political aspects of Czechoslovak unity. In fact, his use of the 
term political unity is entirely unclear, since in reality the Czechoslovak political unity was 
virtually non-existent (Hodža 1920: 323). Yet, Hodža contemplates the Czechoslovak unity as a 
potentially new source of identity substituting for political loyalty to natio Hungarica. Moreover, 
the ideological emphasis on the political character of Czechoslovak ties, dating back to the pre-
war period, appears only after the rise of Czechoslovakia. Previously, Czechoslovak unity was 
defined culturally, with the latent potential to bring about political changes. This conceptual shift 
shows Hodža’s endeavours to identify and to build foundations of a national ideology on the 
basis of a political unity historically legitimized. From the perspective of desired national 
arrangements in Czechoslovakia, it is crucial just how far the ideal of the political unity of the 
Czechoslovak nation reaches, and where it should be constrained by a Slovak distinctiveness. 
Hodža finds a solution for this problem, and for his political career, in pragmatic politics; in other 
words, in a search for compromise. Now I will deal with this in detail. 
What in the beginning appears to be a critique of the split is eventually accepted as a 
historical necessity, bringing into existence the language as an expression of a distinctive culture. 
(Hodža 1920: 400) Evidently, it is not merely Hodža’s acceptance of compelling arguments for 
the split, but a pragmatic raison d'être. By describing Štúr’s internal struggle between a politician 
and scholar, in which the former always prevails, Hodža simply implies that political determinants 
must be seriously considered. The maxim defining politics as the art of the possible within a 
political setting thus determine Hodža’s activities.8 Despite his personal ambition to stand at the 
forefront of Slovak politicians offering and shaping a desired national agenda, his primary 
strategy is permanent access to political power. Notably this brings him to support the merger of 
the Slovak and Czech agrarians in 1921 despite his previous endeavours to reach a political 
agreement with the Ľudaks, for whom autonomy was the ultimate goal. I assume that the book is 
his detailed historical elaboration, his implicit justification of his actual political goals. This, 
however, by no means proves Hodža’s adherence to Prague centralism. 
                                                 
8 This is the reason for historical acceptance of the split. National distinctiveness and its acceptance is an outcome of 
the rational evaluation of circumstances in case of both Štúr in the nineteenth and Hodža in the twentieth century. 
National affinity is therefore rationally based. The similarity in argument between Masaryk and Hodža is rather 
unintentional, as Masaryk derives it from morality, whereas Hodža pragmatically calculates potential gains and losses.  
This should become clearer in the course of the analysis. 
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For Hodža, the universalist idea of Czechoslovak cultural and political unity historically 
precedes Slovak particularism, although he gradually shifts towards more particularist stances. 
While adherence to universalist political and cultural Czechoslovak unity is essential for political 
gains, it is also a paramount moral good, yet only achievable via membership in a particularistic 
Slovak nation defined by its culture, notably language.9 
Hodža never undermines the concept of Czechoslovak political unity. Yet, this universal 
Czechoslovak unity is pre-conditioned by Slovak particularism. This strategy is best understood 
in terms of his political activities, marked by his constant endeavours to find a balance between 
the overall improvement of Slovakia, which inevitably requires the political recognition of the 
Slovak individuality, and the necessity for Czechoslovak political unity. 
The main principles of his theory intrinsically defining his political activities are 
pragmatism and anti-centralism. Admittedly, his anti-centralism, though evident in the beginnings 
of Hodža’s political career in Czechoslovakia, evolved much slower, in the context of the 
determining political environment. 
The specific conditions of pre-war Slovak politics, its weakness and incapacity to act 
independently and offer any tangible national prospects, required tight cooperation with the 
Czechs, yet primarily on a cultural level. On the other hand, this unity did not replace political 
loyalty to Austria-Hungary. Hodža speculates in the 1910s that Czechoslovak mutuality 
(vzájomnosť) may even bring about political changes. In fact, it is an appeal to the Hungarian 
government to change its nationality policies. (Hodža 1920: 170-172) It does not amount to ever 
symbolic defiance. The perpetuation of politically-defined Czech and Slovak relations had yet not 
become part of the political agenda of the day, and the supremacy of political loyalty to Natio 
Hungarica is not to be forgotten. 
The rise of the new nation-state of Czechoslovakia also marked the beginning of ‘Slovak 
politics’, and presented new challenges for Hodža’s previous views. The task that accompanied 
the birth of the new state was to define the arrangements of coexistence between the two 
nations, in the absence of any previous experience of the kind. Unlike Masaryk’s universalist 
theory, considerably detached from daily politics and its national challenges, Hodža’s account is 
                                                 
9 Hodža’s use of the term culture is somewhat unclear, since it seems to be equal parts of both universalistic as well 
as particularistic concepts of nationalism. Evidently he struggles in the very early phase of the existence of the 
Republic with the necessity for a tighter unity. This can be also seen in the context of the merger with the Czech 
agrarians. The emphasis on Slovak cultural particularism, which later occurs more frequently, would not have been 
tactically wise, and entirely inconsistent with overall Hodža’s pragmatic stances. 
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more concerned about the particularistic aspects distinguishing the cultures of the two nations. 
Moreover, Hodža frequently faces national issues, which Masaryk, from his presidential 
perspective10, could afford to overlook or even reject. While Masaryk appeals primarily to reason, 
Hodža pragmatically accentuates emotionality together with reason. (Hodža 1920: 276) As 
Peroutka brilliantly states, unlike other representatives of the Slovak political youth who turned 
into theorizing and moralizing realists under the influence of Masaryk, Hodža remains truly 
realistic. (Peroutka 1991: 244) After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, Hodža was confronted 
with two national challenges. One lies in the founding of Czechoslovakia and subsequent efforts 
to build a common Czech and Slovak national bond that would define political loyalty. The other 
is his conviction of the necessity for political recognition of Slovak individuality. 
Even though Hodža bases political unity on his vaguely expressed pre-war views on the 
Czechoslovak cultural unity, there is an interesting implicit explanation. Culturally, a new state is 
an institutionalization and a confirmation of an existing cultural status quo. The entire historical 
development of Czechoslovak cultural mutuality, though not consciously driven towards some 
political institutionalization, at least proved its coherence, and therefore it was to be freely 
manifested in the new state. Hodža, as a pragmatic politician fully aware of existing national 
tensions, realized the long-term impossibility of such argumentation, which downplays the 
national differences between the two nations. Certainly, cultural mutuality does mean cultural 
sameness. This view is consistent with the perception of Czechoslovakia among Czech political 
elites, but the Slovak political spectrum varied greatly in its views. At the same time, this was the 
view that enabled a political construction of the Czechoslovak language11 to come into existence. 
Unintentionally, and contrary to his particularistic dedication to Slovak individuality, yet in line 
with his theoretical ambiguities on cultural mutuality, Hodža is in theory helping 
‘Czechoslovakeness’ to penetrate into the sphere which he would mainly rather avoid. Thus the 
ambiguity of his emphasis on the continuation of cultural ties has serious political implications. 
As I will show later, Hodža’s oscillation between the inevitability of a universalist, yet 
more moderate expression of the Czechoslovak political and cultural unity on one hand, and the 
recognition of the Slovak individuality on the other, is reflected in his activities as an politician in 
the agrarian party and his endeavours towards the reform of public administration. On one side, 
the idea of a political nation unifying particularistic national communities at a universalist political 
                                                 
10 However, it should be noted again that Masaryk writes neither about ‘Czechoslovakism’ nor, as a president, almost 
anything regarding nationalism. 
11 Indeed, this is merely a constitutional expression without any demonstrated effort to exceed its legal formulation. 
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level; on the other, the call for Slovaks to remain true Slovaks (Hodža 1934: 1973); these ideas 
were propounded by Hodža with ever-greater insistence over the years as he found more and 
more people willing to listen to them. A new generation of political youth from across the entire 
political spectrum in Slovakia demanded a redefinition of Czech and Slovak relations. This 
demand unified the young political community in Slovakia regardless of their mutual ideological 
aversions. 
By challenging the idea of Czechoslovak national unity in the early 1930s, the Slovak 
agrarians-party youth was questioning one of the party’s sacred principles. Hodža expresses his 
understanding for these concerns; however, he can not identify himself with anti-Czechoslovak 
stances. (Hodža 1934: 236-238) In general, centralism is considered the most visible symbol of 
Czechoslovak unity, and this enjoyed no support from a generation raised in Czechoslovak 
schools by Czech professors. There was a widespread demand for the recognition of national and 
cultural distinctiveness between both nations. Such disapproval justified Hodža’s long-term 
efforts and struggles within the party to challenge centralism, which he considered no less 
dangerous for Czechoslovak political unity than the legislative autonomy demanded by 
autonomists. At the time Hodža was, perhaps, the only major agrarian politician enjoying 
widespread respect among the Slovak Agrarian youth. (Holzer 1992: 558) 
In regard to self-governance, after 1920 Hodža systematically endeavoured to present the 
project of administrative or local autonomy for Slovakia as a check onto state centralism and 
Slovak separatism.12 Only thus can the idea of Czechoslovak unity be feasible. Therefore, the 
specific economic, social, and cultural problems in Slovakia require institutionalized self-
governance. The 1923 law on counties was only the beginning of hopes for decentralization, and 
reform of public administration became an essential part of Hodža’s political agenda (Šuchová 
204: 105). 
Intriguingly enough, unlike his cautiously-expressed considerations on nationalism during 
the early days of the Republic, in his anti-centralistic positions Hodža often embraces rhetoric 
quite similar to that of the autonomist Ľudaks, who demanded recognition of the nationality 
principle in public administration. Hodža is thus, perhaps, the only politician from the centralist 
parties to make such demands as early as 1921.13 On one hand, Hodža’s reservations towards the 
extreme autonomists, and his hesitating acceptance of the merger with the Czech centralist 
agrarians, induced him to reluctantly accept the Party’s ideological line. On the other hand, his 
                                                 
12According to Hodža, legislative autonomy is the equivalent of separatism, or at least eventually results in it. 
13 Indeed, Hodža does not deny the inevitability of the Czech intellectual support for Slovakia. 
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concern and personal ambitions for improving conditions in Slovakia very soon separated him 
from the centralist core of the party, as well as Slovak centralists in the other parties. 
The 1928 law on the provinces raised new expectations for effective local government.14 
In practice it severely restricted local autonomy, and its bureaucratic apparatus was subordinated 
to the central government. Due to rising pressures from centralists, including those in the 
agrarian party, Hodža did not directly contribute to the drafting of the law as much as he has 
wished. His disappointment seems to have been reflected in terse, occasional criticism of the 
legislation by a committed man who would otherwise have rapturously welcomed these changes. 
Speaking out against cultural centralism and insinuating that Slovakia was being exploited 
despite its strategic geopolitical position, Hodža clearly radicalizes his rhetoric in the 1930s, 
notably in his reference to the penetration of ‘Czechizms’ into the Slovak language. (Hodža 1934: 
233-234) Yet, he remains firm in his adherence to Czechoslovak political unity, without placing 
much emphasis on its cultural bonds. The importance of universalistic Czechoslovak ties was 
waning. The conditions of political struggle, and the temporary political failures and falls15 of this 
ambitious politician, determined his views and shifted him markedly towards more nationalistic 
stances. Yet Hodža does not abandon the overall universalist obligation. Thus the primacy of the 
political bond of a universalistic Czechoslovak unity linking together the particularist identities of 
the two nations remains alive in Hodža’s speeches. The worsening situation in Central Europe in 
the mid-1930s made any change towards a more self-governing model in Slovakia practically 
unfeasible. Even so, Hodža, in a speech on nationality policy 1937, expressed satisfaction with 
the uplifting of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia in practically all spheres of life. (Hodža 
1938:26) But rising pressure from the autonomists demonstrated the contrary, which Hodža 
himself realized in the case of the unfinished reform of public administration. The project of the 
Czechoslovak political nation faded only with the forced disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 
1939. However, in terms of Hodža’s concept and his political endeavours it was never realized. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Ivan Dérer, Hodža’s ideological rival from the socialist camp, at same time one of the 
most devoted Slovak centralist politicians, tellingly summarizes Hodža’s political activities: “he 
                                                 
14 Abolished counties were replaced by four provinces with their own assemblies; two thirds of their members were 
elected and one third appointed by the government. 
15 Hodža was compelled to withdraw from a political life in the end of 1920s after losing his position in the party, but 
he achieved the climax of his career as prime minister in the period 1935–1938. 
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[Hodža] is neither an autonomist nor a separatist… yet he presented them with the provisional 
law which they never seriously considered.” (Dérer 1928: 226) Dérer unambiguously grasped the 
ambiguity of Hodža’s position. Particularistic Slovak ties oblige him to defend these interests, 
while cautiously trying to avoid endangering his political career, and remaining loyal to the 
universalistic concept of political Czechoslovak unity. His long-term efforts at justification of his 
standpoints determined his political stances. He never renounces universal Czechoslovak ties. But 
his particularistic Slovak attachments forced him into compromises in order to secure his career 
prospects, occasionally abetting the particularistic Slovak allegiance (unfinished reform of public 
administration, for example). On the other hand, his political failures gradually shifted him 
towards less emotional manifestations of his insulted particularistic believes. However, the 
unfeasibility of building a political Czechoslovak nation should be apparent already in the 
ambiguous attempt to define it on the basis of the previous Czech and Slovak cultural interaction, 
and the inability to redefine it and utilise it accordingly in political practice. 
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